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Article 1

The Uncertain Future of Sentencing
Guidelines
Richard S. Frase*
I. Introduction
As of the fall of 1993, at least 15 states and the federal government had adopted or were in the process of adopting sentencing
guidelines developed by an independent sentencing commission.1
Minnesota pioneered this approach to sentencing reform in 1978.2
Its guidelines have now been in effect for more than a decade, and
they have been more extensively studied and evaluated than any
other system. 3 In addition, many observers believe that the Minne* Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota.
This article is an expanded and updated version of the lecture Professor Frase gave
at the Law School on February 4, 1992, to inaugurate the Benjamin N. Berger
Professorship.
1. See 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. (forthcoming). Besides Minnesota, other states
with commission-based sentencing guidelines include Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In addition, the American Bar Association
has recently renewed and strengthened its support for Minnesota-type, commissionbased guidelines. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES AND APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, Standards 18-4.1 to

18-4.4 (Third Edition, approved February 9, 1993), reprinted in 52 Cnmi. L. REP.
2353, 2363 (1993). See infra text accompanying note 186.
2. See 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 723 (Guidelines enabling statute). The initial version of the Guidelines was contained in MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES Comm., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Commission Report].

The

current version of the Guidelines can be found at MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244, §§ I-V
(Appendix) (West 1993) and also at MINN. R. CT., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND COMMENTARY, §§ I-V (West 1993) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].

3. See, e.g., MIN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GnDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984) [hereinafter
1984 COMMISSION REPORT]; DALE PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE
EvoLUTiON OF MINNESOTA'S SlNTENCING GUIDELINES (1988); Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten
Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. PoL'y 279 (1993) (evaluating success of

the Guidelines, through 1989, in achieving the Commission's stated or apparent
goals) [hereinafter Frase 1993a]; Richard S. Frase, The Role of the Legislature, the
Sentencing Commission,and Other Officials Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 345 (1993) [hereinafter Frase 1993b]; Kay A. Knapp,
What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplished, 68 JumcATURE 181 (1984); Terance D. Miethe, Chargingand Plea BargainingPractices under
Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1987); Charles A. Moore & Terance D.
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sota Sentencing Guidelines remain one of the better-designed and
successful systems of this type. 4 Ironically, the more-recently-enacted Federal Sentencing Guidelines may be the worst example,5
and they have certainly received the most recent attention.6 It thus
seems appropriate to turn our attention away from the Federal
Guidelines, for the moment, and consider how the original prototype is doing; all sentencing.guidelines systems are not the same.
It is particularly important to consider the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines at this point in their history because of another
irony: at the very moment when Minnesota's guidelines are being
widely praised and copied by other states, they continue to face attack in Minnesota. The Guidelines have been criticized from many
points of view: by conservatives, liberals, academics, members of
the public, and judges.7
Miethe, Regulatedand UnregulatedSentencing Decisions:An Analysis of First-Year
PracticesUnder Minnesota'sFelony Sentencing Guidelines, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 253
(1986); Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Socio-Economic Disparitiesunder
Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Pre-guidelineand Post-guideline
Practices in Minnesota, 23 CRiMONOLOGY 337 (1985); Terance D. Miethe & Charles
A. Moore, Can Sentencing Reform Work? A Four-Year Evaluation of Determinate
Sentencing in Minnesota (1987) (unpublished paper presented at the 1987 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, copy on file with the author).
Dale Parent's book is reviewed and updated (through 1988) in Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After, 75 Mum. L. RFv. 727 (1991) [hereinafter Frase 1991a]. See also Debra L. Dailey, The Sentencing of Sex Offenders
Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines:Is There a Need for Change? 10 HAMLiNE J. Pus. L & POL'Y 193 (1989); SymposiuM ON DETERMINATE SENTENCiNG, 5 HAMLINE L. REv. 161-437 (1982) (articles and research projects on Minnesota

Guidelines).
4. See, e.g., Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 364-66 (finding the Guidelines substantially achieved their stated goals); Michael Tonry, The Success of Judge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 CoLO. L. REv. 713, 717-20 (1993) (commenting on
the widespread support for Minnesota-like guidelines and their ability to reduce sentencing disparity and control growth in prison populations); Michael H. Tonry,
StructuringSentencing, 10 CRiM & JusT., 267, 286-87 (1988); Andrew Von Hirsch &
Judith Greene, When Should Reformers Support Creationof Sentencing Guidelines?
28 WAKE FOR. L. REV. 329-34 (1993).
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1741-47
(1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guideline Sentencing:No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRi. L. REv. 161 (1991); Michael Tonry, The Failureof the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Guidelines, 39 CRiuE & DELINQ. 131 (1993).

6. See, e.g., Symposium, A Decade of Sentencing Guidelines:Revisiting the Role
of the Legislature, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 181 (1993) (8 of 11 articles deal with

Federal Guidelines); Symposium on Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99
(1992); Symposium, Punishment, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) (three articles on Federal Guidelines); Symposium, Making Sense of the FederalGuidelines, 25 U.C. DAvis
L. Rmy. 563 (1992); FederalSentencing GuidelinesSymposium, 29 Am. Cius. L. Rzy.
771 (1992).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 47-60.
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In this article, I will summarize the principal recent criticisms
of guidelines sentencing, focusing on those most applicable to the
Minnesota system. I will then argue that these criticisms are based
on misunderstandings of how the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
actually work and what they have actually accomplished. The
truth is that the Guidelines have achieved most of their major intended goals, and remain a model of rational and effective sentencing, worthy of retention in Minnesota, and of emulation by
reformers in other states and at the Federal level. 8 The Guidelines
balance uniformity and flexibility, give appropriate weight to all of
the traditional purposes of punishment, and reconcile public demands for increased severity with the reality of limited correctional
resources. In each of these key dimensions of sentencing - allowable discretion, punishment goals, and sanction severity - the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized from "both
sides." These conflicting critiques suggest not that the Guidelines
have failed, but rather that they succeeded in achieving an appropriate and stable compromise on these inherently controversial issues of sentencing policy. This careful balance is the key to the
success of the Minnesota Guidelines, and to the failure of their Federal counterpart.
This article was originally delivered as a lecture to an audience composed largely of non-lawyers and lawyers who do not specialize in sentencing. 9 In revising it for publication, I have tried to
retain the lecture's non-technical tone. Although my conclusions
should interest sentencing reformers and scholars, it is even more
important that they be heard and understood by non-specialized
legislators, governors, and other policy makers in Minnesota and
elsewhere. This published version also reflects data on the Guidelines developments which has become available since the date of
the original lecture.1O In some respects, my conclusions are more
8. The Clinton administration will have the opportunity to fill several positions

on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and major revisions of the Federal Guidelines
have recently been proposed. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 5, at 1740-52.
9. See supra note *.
10. Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 279-80 n.2 (describing the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission's data-gathering program). The lecture version of this
Article was based on calendar-year evaluation data sets through 1989. Since the

date of the lecture, data sets have become available for 1990 and 1991.

MINN. SENN, SUMMARY OF 1990 SENTENCING PRACTICES FOR CONVICTED FELONS (1992) [hereinafter 1990 DATA SuMMARY]; MINN. SENTENCING
TENCING GUIDELINES COM

GUIDELINES

COMm'N, SENTENCINo PRCnCEs: HIGHLIGHTS AND STATISTICAL TABLES,
FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 1991 (1993) [hereinafter 1991 DATA SUMMARY].

In addition to these annual data summaries and other reports (e.g., 1984 COMsupra note 3), the Guidelines Commission has made its computerized data files available to outside researchers. In the remainder of this article,
when statistical results are cited by year or data set only (e.g., "1991 EVALUATION
MISSION REPORT,
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optimistic now than they were when the lecture was delivered.
Although Minnesota's sentencing system continues to face serious
criticism and challenge, it remains, in comparison to other American jurisdictions, a model.
A

How the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Work

The Guidelines became effective May 1, 1980, and govern sentencing in all felony cases (crimes punishable with more than one
year of imprisonment). 1 1 The heart of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines is the sentencing grid shown in Figure 1.12 The Guidelines primarily determine whether a defendant should be sentenced
to state prison, and if so, for how long. The two major determinants
of this decision are the severity of the most serious conviction offense and the extent of the defendant's prior criminal record. These
two factors are represented by the vertical and horizontal scales of
the grid, respectively. A defendant's conviction offense and criminal history score place him or her in one of the cells of the grid. The
number in the cell represents the duration of the recommended
prison sentence in months.
The heavy black line running across the grid is called the disposition line:13 in cells below this line, the Guidelines recommend
that a prison sentence be immediately executed and that a defendant be committed to prison.14 The single number at the top of those
cells is the recommended or best sentence, but the two figures below that provide a range within which the sentence could fall and
still be considered consistent with the Guidelines. Above the disposition line, the Guidelines generally recommend a stayed (i.e., suspended) prison sentence equal to the number of months shown in
each cell.' 5 A stayed prison sentence is conditional: it will not be
served unless the defendant violates the terms of probation and the
stay is revoked.16 Stayed prison sentences are normally accompaDATA Sz'r"), rather than to any publication, such findings are based on the author's

own analysis of the Commission's data, using the SPSS PC+ statistical program (version 4.01).
11. GuIDELUN S, supra note 2, § I (Statement of Purposes and Principles); MiMN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.02, subd. 2 (West 1993) (felony definition).
12. GUIDELNES, supra note 2, § IV (Sentencing Guidelines grid).
13. 1980 COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.

14. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § II.C (Presumptive Sentence).
15. Id. A few cases falling above the disposition line carry a presumptive executed prison term. GUIDELNES, supra note 2, § ILE (Mandatory Sentences). Most of
these involve use or possession of a dangerous weapon, which is subject to
mandatory minimum prison terms under a state statute. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.11, subds. 4-9 (West 1993).
16. MwN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (West 1993) (Stay of Imposition of Sentence);
GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § III.
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Figure 1
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Grid
Effective August 1, 1989
Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within which a
judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
SEVERITY LEVEL OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE

Saleofa Simulated

I

I

12'

12'

6 or more

3

12'

13

15

17

19
18-20

Controlled Substanme

Theft Related Crimes
($2500 or less)

II

12'

12'

13

15

17

19

Theft Crimnes

1

12'

is

1

17

($2500 or less)

NonresidentialBurglary

IV

12'

15

18

21

Theft Crimes (over $2500)

ResidentialBurglary

V

18

23

27

Simple Robbery

Criminal Sexual Conduct

VI

21

26

30

2nd Degree (a) & (b)

Aggravated Robbery

21
20-22

Check Forgery (*20O-$250)

VII

19

22

25

18-20

21-21

24-26

25

32

41

24-26

30-34

37-45

30

38

46

54

29-31

36-40

43-49

50-58

34

44

54

65

33-35

42-46

50-58

60-70

48

58

68

78

88

98

108

44-52

54-62

64-72

74-82

84-92

94-102

104-112

Criminal Sexual Conduct
1st Degree

VIII

Assault, 1stDegree

86

98

81-91

93-103

110

105-115

122

134

146

158

117-127

129-139

141-151

153-163

Murder,3rd Degree
Murder, 2nd Degree
(felony murder)

Murder, 2nd Degre
(with intent)

195

210

225

240

144-156

159-171

174-186

189-201

204-216

219-231

234-246

X 306
299-313

326
319-333

346
339-353

366
359-373

386
379-393

406
399-413

426
419-433

1M

150

165

180

Under state statutes, 1st Degree Murder has a mandatory life sentence.
* one year and one day
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nied by several conditions such as: incarceration in a local jail for
up to one year and/or required participation in a treatment program, supervision by a probation officer, community service, restitution to the victim, or payment of a fine.17
It is important to note that the Guidelines' recommendations
as to execution and duration of prison terms are "presumptive,"1S
not mandatory. Thus, although a prescribed sentence is presumed
to be correct, a court may depart from this recommendation if it
finds that "substantial and compelling circumstances" call for a different sentence. 19 A judge must state his or her reasons for departing from the Guidelines. 20 Whether or not the sentence imposed is
a departure, both the defendant and the prosecution may appeal
the sentence. 2 1
If a defendant does go to prison, either initially or later, following revocation of a stayed sentence, the prison term imposed will be
reduced by up to one-third, for good behavior in prison.2 2 Thus, a
thirty-six month Guidelines sentence becomes a twenty-four month
sentence if the defendant earns the maximum "good time" reduction. Any reduction the defendant earns becomes a period of postprison supervision similar to the traditional parole term. 23 Thus,
the defendant with the thirty-six month sentence who was released
after twenty-four months would serve a twelve month Supervised
Released Term. The conditions of release might include periodic
contacts with a supervising officer, random drug tests, curfews,
etc. 2 4 A violation of those conditions can result in the return of the
defendant to prison to serve out his or her remaining term. 25

B. Origins and Purposes of Sentencing Guidelines
In order to understand the current status and future prospects
of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, one must understand how
they evolved, what purposes they serve, and more fundamentally,
17. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § IIIA (Establishing Conditions of Stayed
Sentences); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09, subd. 5 (West 1993); Minn. Sentencing
Guidelines Comm., Report to the legislature on Intermediate Sanctions (1991)
(passim).

18. GUIDELINES,
19. GUIDELINES,
20. MINN. STAT.
§ II.D.
21. MIN. STAT.
22. MINN. STAT.
til August 1, 1993);

supra note 2, § II.C.
supra note 2, §§ I, II.D.
ANN. § 244.10, subd. 2 (West 1993); GUIDELINES, supra note 2,
ANN. § 244.11 (West 1993).
ANN. § 244.04 (West 1993) (provisions applicable from 1980 unMIm. STAT. ANN. § 244.101 (West 1993) (provisions applicable

after August 1, 1993).

23. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.05 (West 1992).
24. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.05, subd. 6; 244.08 (West 1992).
25. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.05, subd. 3 (West 1992).
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what purposes punishment itself may serve. Traditionally, four
major purposes of punishment have been recognized: rehabilitation,
incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution.26 The first three are
designed to prevent crime: rehabilitation does this through treatment and reform of offenders; incapacitation does it by imprisoning
the most dangerous offenders, to restrain them from committing
crimes against the public; deterrence discourages future crimes by
a particular defendant and other would-be offenders through fear of
punishment (and, in the long run, by using criminal penalties to
define and reinforce important social values). The fourth goal, retribution, aims not to prevent crime but rather to give defendants
their "just deserts" by imposing penalties directly proportional to
the seriousness of an offense. One theory, "defining retributivism,"
27
seeks to scale punishment precisely to each defendant's "desert."
A more modest version of this theory, "limiting retributivism,"
merely sets upper and lower bounds - sentences must not be inhumane, nor excessively severe or unduly lenient. Within these outer
limits, punishment is scaled according to what is needed to achieve
crime-preventive goals.28
Prior to adoption of sentencing guidelines, the dominant purposes of punishment were rehabilitation and incapacitation. To
achieve these goals, judges and parole boards were given substantial discretion to assess the treatability and dangerousness of each
individual offender. 29 Under this system, known as "indeterminate
sentencing,"3 0 judges could impose any sentence from probation to
the maximum prison term authorized by law. In addition, parole
boards had broad discretion to decide how much of any imposed
31
prison sentence would actually have to be served.
In the early 1970s, however, a broad consensus began to develop that indeterminate sentencing was both ineffective and un26. See KENr GREENAWALT, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1336-46 (1983)

(defining "Punishment"); PETER W. Low Er AL., CRIMNAL LAw: CASES & MATERIALS
1-28 (2d ed. 1986).
27. See NORvAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 182-196 (1982);
NoRVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRisoNmENT 73-6, 78 (1974).
28. MORRIs, Madness and the CriminalLaw, supra note 27, at 196-202; Low ET

AL., supra note 26, at 4, 7, 12-14, 25 n.b.
29. See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1-4 (Alfred Blumstein et al., eds., 1983); Franklin E. Zimring, A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform, 4-15 (1977) [hereinafter Zimring 1977], reprinted in FRANKIUN ZIMRING &
RICHARD FRASE, THE CRInNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
AND REFORM OF THE CRIMNAL LAw 763-65, 933-39 (1980); PAUL TAPPAN, CRIME, JusTICE AND CORRImcroN 430-37 (1960), reprinted in ZIMRING & FRASE, supra, at 758763.
30. BLUMSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 29, at 2.
31. Id.
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just.32 Conservatives objected to lenient probation and parole

release decisions which they believed resulted in less punishment
than offenders deserved, failed to provide sufficiently certain and
severe punishment to deter crime, and failed to incapacitate dangerous offenders. 33 Liberals also attacked indeterminate sentencing. They argued that the exercise of discretion by judicial and
parole authorities led to unjust disparities and racial bias in the
treatment of equally serious offenders.3 4 In addition, prisoners
themselves objected to the uncertainty imposed upon them by the
parole system. In some states, such as California, a defendant convicted of a felony would not know upon entering prison whether he
5
or she would be held there for one year or for life.3
At the same time, academics were increasingly questioning
the indeterminate sentencing system. Some concluded that the individualized assessments of each offender's treatment needs, progress in treatment, and degree of dangerousness were too
unreliable and produced too much disparity in sentencing. Most
treatment programs (especially in-prison programs) could not be
shown to be effective.3 6 Other academics argued for a return to
sentencing based primarily on a retributive, "just deserts" theory37
- each offender should be punished in direct proportion to the seriousness of the harm caused by the offense and to his or her moral
culpability in committing that offense, with little or no consideration given to crime prevention.
By the mid-1970s, a "bi-partisan" consensus had formed that
discretion in sentencing must be substantially reduced, and that
38
sentences should be made more uniform and more proportional.
All offenders who commit the same crime should receive substantially the same punishment. The severity of that punishment
should be determined primarily by the seriousness of the defend32. See id. at 1-4.
33. Id. (listing six factors associated with widespread dissatisfaction with indeterminate sentences).

34. Id.
35. See Zimring 1977, supra note 29, at 934.
36. FRANCIs ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHARiLrrATIvE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); Low ET AL., supra note 26, at 25-6.
37. See generally DAviD FOGEL, "... WE ARE THE LrviNG PROOF. . ." THE JUSTICE
MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975); TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT - REPORT OF THE TwENTiETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
CRIMINAL SENTENCING (1976); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CmMINALS (1975);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DoING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
38. BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 3. See also Sheldon L. Messinger &

Philip E. Johnson, California'sDeterminateSentencing Statute: History and Issues
(1977), reprintedin ZIMRING & FRASE, supra note 29, at 950-87 (describing the wide
spectrum of political and social interest groups which shaped sentencing reform in

California).
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ant's offense, and secondarily by the extent of the offender's prior
record. As a result of this consensus, states began to enact so-called
"determinate" sentencing laws, which sharply limited judicial and/
or parole board discretion. Some states (e.g., California)3 9 adopted
legislatively-prescribed sentences, specifying a narrow sentencing
range for each offense, with minor adjustments for aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature took a different approach.40 Following the suggestions of a number of writers,41 the
Minnesota Legislature created a specialized administrative agency,
the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, to develop and implement
presumptively correct sentences for each combination of offense and
offender characteristics. 42 The Commission was to be composed of
judges, law enforcement and correctional officials, prosecution and
defense attorneys, and members of the public. 43 The legislature directed the new Sentencing Guidelines Commission to take previous
sentencing practices as well as existing correctional resources into
substantial consideration in drafting the Guidelines. 4 4 Beyond
this, the Legislature did not impose any particular theory of punishment, but instead seemed to be saying that sentencing should be
more uniform and less discretionary in its pursuit of all of the tradi45
tional purposes of punishment.
Since the Minnesota Guidelines took effect in 1980, they have
been widely praised and copied. Many other states, and the federal
government, adopted similar approaches of presumptive sentences
46
promulgated by independent sentencing commissions.
C. Do Sentencing Guidelines Have a Future?
Considering the broad political and social consensus which led
to sentencing guidelines and the many jurisdictions which have
now adopted this approach, the future of sentencing guidelines
39. Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.5, 1168, 1170, 1170.1a, 1170.1b, 2931, 3000, 12022,

12022.5-12022.7 (West 1976) (1976 California Determinate Sentencing Law), excerpted in ZIMRING & FRASE, supra note 29, at 796-803. See also BLUMSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 189-91; Messinger & Johnson, supra note 38.
40. The legislative history of the Minnesota Guidelines Enabling Act, 1978 Laws

ch. 723, and the Sentencing Commission's implementation of its statutory mandate,
are described in PARENT, supra note 3. See also Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 34654.
41. The idea of an independent sentencing commission was apparently first proposed in MARvIn E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHouT ORDER (1973).
42. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 244,09 (West 1992).
43. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09, subd, 2 (West 1992).
44. 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 723, sec. 9.
45. Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 347-49.
46. See supra note 1.
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would seem to be assured, especially in Minnesota. Yet, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines currently face some of their most serious challenges. In addition to calls for outright repeal of the
Guidelines (which have been voiced intermittently ever since they
were enacted), we are witnessing an increasing variety of less drastic proposals which would nevertheless destroy the careful political
and public policy balance represented by the Guidelines, and would
lead to a system which is far less effective and just.
Recent critical writings and legislative trends
In June of 1991, the Minnesota Legislative Auditor issued a
report concluding that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are too
47
inflexible, and that judges should be given more discretion.
Meanwhile, other critics were saying that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines do not go far enough in controlling judicial discretion. 48 In the fall of 1991, Professor Albert Alschuler of the
University of Chicago Law School published a very critical article
focusing primarily on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but seem49
ing to call for the abandonment of all similar guidelines systems.
Alschuler argued that sentencing guidelines are inherently too
rigid and too dominated by retributive, offense-based theories of
punishment.5 0 Again, other critics have made the opposite complaint: that Minnesota's guidelines are not retributive enough. 5 l
Professor Alschuler also repeated two long-standing criticisms
of guidelines. The first is that they give prosecutors too much control over sentences because a prosecutor's charges determine the
severity of the charged crimes, thus affecting a defendant's placement on the grid.52 The second criticism is that presumptive
sentences are likely to cause sudden, drastic increases in sentencing severity in response to short-term public hysteria and "law and
47. MINN. LEGIsLATrIVE AuDITOR, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL PoucIES 101-

102 (1991).
48. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SysTEM 28-32, 49-55

(1990) (Minnesota Guidelines should also specify aggregate severity ranges for conditions of stayed sentences); PARENT, supra note 3, at 209 (same critique). See also
infra text accompanying notes 58-59 (proposed mandatory penalties).
49. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines:A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991).
50. Id. at 908-24; see also MINN. LEGISLATrIvE AuDrrOR, supra note 47, at 101.

51. See, e.g., PARENT, supra note 3, at 161-66; Miethe & Moore 1987, supra note
3, at 5-6; Kay A. Knapp, Structured Sentencing: Building on Experience, 72 JUDICATURE 46, 48 (1988).
52. See Alschuler, supra note 49, at 925-28; see generally Albert W. Alschuler,
Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposals for
'Fixed" and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. Rev. 550 (1978).
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order" politics. 53 As Professor Frank Zimring stated, fifteen years

earlier:
Once a determinate sentencing bill is before the legislative
body, it takes no more than an eraser to make a one-year "presumptive sentence" into a six-year sentence for the same offense. The delicate scheme of priorities in any well-conceived
be torpedoed by amendment with ease
sentencing proposal can
5
and political appeal. 4
Moreover, the Guidelines produced "real time" sentences: Minnesota defendants are expected to serve at least two-thirds of a presumptive term. 55 Under the previous system of indeterminate

sentencing, legislators could increase maximum statutory penalties, knowing that the latter were largely symbolic; few 5defendants
6
served anything close to the maximum allowable term.
Meanwhile, Minnesota has recently experienced just such a
period of public hysteria over crime, with more and more calls for
substantially increased sentencing severity.5 7 One legislative proposal would have turned all of the Guideline's prison terms into
mandatory minimum sentences, rather than presumptive
sentences subject to adjustment both up and down.5 8 Although
such drastic reforms were not adopted, the Legislature has enacted
more and more mandatory minimum prison terms for certain offenses.5 9 At the same time, statutes enacted in 1989 through 1992
increased judicial and correctional discretion to consider the dangerousness and treatability of particular defendants.60
In defense of the Guidelines - two themes
Well, so what? No one ever expected the original version of
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to remain unchanged forever.
Indeed, they must and should evolve and change over time. In my
view, however, many of the recently proposed changes in the Guidelines and related sentencing laws are based on misunderstandings
of how the Guidelines work. These proposals are likely to produce
"reforms" which destroy much of what the Guidelines have
53. Alschuler, supra note 49, at 929-38. See also Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard
Orland, A ConversationAbout Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 655-77 (1993).
54. Zimring 1977, supra note 29, at 938.
55. See supra text accompanying note 22.
56. See, e.g., ZnImNG & FRASE, supra note 29, at 816, table 45 (data on average

sentences imposed and time served, by offense).
57. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 359-63 (describing these events).
58. See Donna Halvorsen, IR Crime PlanHas Get Tough Focus, STAR Taim. (Minneapolis), January 10, 1992, at lB.
59. Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 360, 363.
60. Id. at 360-63.
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achieved and will make sentencing in Minnesota more costly, less
effective, and less just. As explained below, even small tinkerings
with the Guidelines, making them more "flexible" in some areas
and more "mandatory" in others, have a serious potential for harmful consequences and would, if continued year after year, eventually
produce the same effect as outright repeal. Repeal is not inconceivable; it is possible that, as happened in 1978, liberals and conservatives will once again come to a consensus (each for very different
reasons, to be sure) in favor of drastic sentencing reform. It seems
much more likely, however, that the Guidelines will not be repealed; instead, they may simply be

-

slowly but surely -

nibbled

to death.
The remainder of this Article will be devoted to two themes.
The first theme, developed in Part II, is "myth and reality": common misconceptions which underlie recent criticisms of the Guidelines. Analysis of these criticisms with respect to three key
dimensions of sentencing reveals their shallow and contradictory
nature -

myth and counter-myth:

" control ofjudicial discretion:some critics argue that sentencing guidelines are too rigid, while others (including the proponents of mandatory minimum sentences) argue that the
guidelines are not rigid enough;
* sentencing purposes: some critics claim that Minnesota-style
guidelines are too retributive; others say they are not retributive enough;
" sentencing severity: some critics believe that Minnesota
Guidelines sentences are too lenient, while others argue that
they are too severe - indeed, that determinate sentencing
reforms inevitably lead to rapidly escalating sanction
severity.
These mirror-image critiques often reflect opposing political perspectives, thus suggesting that the "strange bedfellows" liberaland-conservative coalition which created the Guidelines in 1978
may indeed be about to re-emerge and abolish them. Moreover, attempts to fend off one side's critiques tend to add support to the
other's. However, these charges and counter-charges can also be
viewed in a positive light: as evidence that the Guidelines have
struck an appropriate balance. In an area as emotional and politically-sensitive as sentencing, neither side can or should ever be
completely satisfied; compromise is essential and unavoidable.
The second theme, discussed in Part III, examines the opposite side of the coin: the vitally important but often overlooked successes of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. In responding to
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critics of the Guidelines, it is all too easy to lose sight of their virtues, and of how much better Minnesota's sentencing and correctional system is than systems in other states, in the federal courts,
and in Minnesota prior to the Guidelines. The Guidelines have
been remarkably successful, not only in striking an appropriate balance with respect to sentencing discretion, purposes, and severity
(Part II), but also in achieving three key goals: reduced sentencing
disparity and racial bias, avoidance of prison overcrowding, and the
promotion of more informed and comprehensive sentencing policy.
The Article concludes with some thoughts about how to preserve
these important accomplishments, and to maintain the Guidelines'
careful balance.
H. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines - Myth and Reality
A. Degree of Judicial Discretion
Myth: Guidelines do not Give Judges Enough Discretion
(and Give Prosecutors too much)
Whatever our sentencing purposes may be - whether to select defendants for treatment or for incapacitation based on individualized assessments of each offender's background, or simply to
impose each defendant's particular "just deserts" - some critics of
guidelines sentencing argue that these decisions must be made by
judges on an individualized basis, and cannot be made in the aggregate. 6 ' In other words, sentencing offenders in groups, or by any
preconceived formula, is unjust and ineffective. Many of these critics also argue that Minnesota-style conviction-offense-based guidelines essentially turn the sentencing decision over to the prosecutor,
and eliminate a court's ability to counteract unreasonable charging
decisions. 6 2
Judicial discretion
Sentencing guidelines are intended to be less flexible than the
totally discretionary sentencing methods they replace. However,
they are not inherently rigid or inflexible; all guideline systems permit judges to recognize exceptions. In Minnesota, about 20 percent
of sentences are departures from the Guidelines.63 About 10 percent of sentences are so-called "dispositional" departures - that is,
61. See generally Alschuler, supra note 49.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
63. 1991 EVALUATION DATA SET, supra note 10. The 20 percent figure in text

includes durational departures in stayed - as well as executed - prison cases; if only
executed-prison durational departures are included, the combined dispositional plus
durational departure rate is 15.6 percent. Id.
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either commitment to prison of a defendant with a presumptive
stayed prison term (an "aggravated" dispositional departure), or a
sentence of probation for a defendant with a presumptive executed
prison term ("mitigated" departures). Mitigated dispositional departures are especially common. 64 Another 8 percent of cases are
durational departures, 6 5 which are sometimes longer, but more
often shorter, than the presumptive duration.6 6 About 2 percent of
sentences involve both a dispositional and a durational
departure. 67
In addition to the formal departure power illustrated above,
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines do not regulate plea bargaining decisions, and place almost no limits on conditions of non-prison
(stayed) sentences. All in all, it is clear that Minnesota judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys retain substantial flexibility to
tailor sentences to the specific facts of each case, especially in less
serious cases. In practice, mitigating discretion is especially likely
to be exercised in the case of a first offender.68
Nor should it be assumed that additional flexibility would
more effectively achieve rehabilitative and incapacitative goals.
Judges' assessments of the treatability and dangerousness of particular offenders may be reliable enough if limited, as they now are
under the Guidelines and related sentencing laws, to exceptional
cases (departures) and to relatively minor sanctions (stay conditions). However, given the primitive state of our current "science"
of prediction, as well as the practical and financial limitations of the
criminal justice system, such individualized assessments are likely
to be much less reliable if they are routinely attempted in non-exceptional cases. In the latter cases, assessments of dangerousness
and suitability for probation will probably be more reliable if based
on group predictions tied to criminal histories and current of64. In order to compare the tendency to grant mitigated versus aggravated dispositional departures, each type must be evaluated relative to the number of persons
eligible for that type of departure. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 298-99. For
defendants with presumptive-executed-prison sentences, the mitigated dispositional
departure rate is over 30 percent. 1991 EVALUATION DATA SET, supra note 10.
Among presumptive-stay cases, only about 4 percent receive an aggravated dispositional departure. Id.
65. 1991 EVALUATION DATA SET, supra note 10.
66. About two-thirds of all durational departures (including stayed-prison terms)
are mitigated. 1990 DATA SUMMARY supra note 10, at 40. Among defendants who
receive an executed prison sentence, over 30 percent are durational departures, twothirds of them mitigated. Id. at 41.
67. 1991 EVALUATION DATA SET, supra note 10.
68. See 1991 DATA SumbARY, supra note 10, at 20; Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at
321-23.
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fenses. 69 Although the Minnesota Sentencing Commission never
officially adopted a group-prediction rationale, its criminal history
score does have that effect. Criminological research has shown that
offenders with longer criminal histories are more likely to commit
further crimes. 7 0 Under the Guidelines, defendants with lengthy
criminal history scores and/or a very serious current offense are, in
effect, assumed to be more dangerous and less treatable outside of
prison.71 They receive longer presumptive prison durations, and
line, pretheir cases are more likely to fall below the disposition
72
sumptively requiring execution of the prison sentence.
Prosecutorial discretion
Unlike the Federal Guidelines, the offense scale of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is based almost entirely on the formal
elements of the most serious conviction offense; other charges
which were never filed, or which were dropped in plea bargaining,
have little or no effect on prison commitment and duration decisions.7 3 This choice was considered to be necessary in order to preserve legal standards of conviction, that is, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, jury trial, limits on admissible evidence, etc.
Sentencing based on unproven facts, so-called "real offense" sentencing, was believed to be less reliable and less fair.7 4 However,
some critics of guidelines sentencing have argued that any conviction-offense system simply hands over control of sentencing to the
prosecutor. By filing a more severe or more numerous charges, or
conversely by not filing such charges or by dropping them in plea
bargaining, the prosecutor can determine which "box" the defendant ends up in, and thus can limit the court to a narrow sentencing
75
range which may be either too high or too 10w.

69. See Barry C. Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution:The

Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REv. 515,
543-46 (1978) (actuarial predictions of future crime are more reliable than individualized ("clinical") predictions; actuarial predictions should only be based on current
offense and prior conviction record).
70. See, e.g., MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 162,
table 10.3 (1972).
71. See Frase 1991a, supra note 3, text accompanying note 90.
72. Id.
73. But see Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 288 n.29 (noting limited "real offense"
sentencing permitted under Minnesota Guidelines).
74. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing,
45 STAN. L. REV. 523 (1993). Other critiques of real-offense sentencing include: Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 733, 757-772
(1980); and Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Enforcing Sentencing Guidelines:Plea
Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS
GuiDELINEs 152-61 (Andrew Von Hirsch et. al. eds., 1987).
75. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Although this argument has a certain surface plausibility, it
deteriorates on closer inspection. Under-charging - that is, charging which produces a lower sentencing range than a judge would
have wanted - is probably fairly rare. 76 Prosecutors are advocates, whose job is to argue for the most severe sentence they can.
Thus, improper under-charging only occurs when the evidence is
too weak to support heavier charges, or when the prosecutor is corrupt, incompetent, or has insufficient resources. However, these
problems are likely to prevent adequate punishment under any
sentencing system; they are not made significantly worse by conviction-offense guidelines, and would not disappear in the absence of
such guidelines.
The opposite problem - that of a prosecutor "over charging,"
forcing the judge to impose a sentence which is too severe under the
circumstances - is potentially more serious. Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, though, unlike their much-criticized federal counterpart, are presumptive, not mandatory. 7 7 Minnesota's guidelines
strongly encourage, but do not require, judges to impose presumptive sentences. Moreover, if a case is over-charged as an evidentiary matter -

that is, if the case is not provable at trial -

an

effective defense attorney will encourage the defendant to insist on
trial. Again, repeal of sentencing guidelines, or relaxation of the
conviction-offense limitation, would not eliminate whatever
problems of ineffective assistance of counsel there may be.
Thus, although charging decisions by prosecutors under a conviction-offense guidelines system certainly have an impact on sentencing, this impact is limited by a prosecutor's adversarial
preference for higher charges, by the legal requirements of proof,
and by the power of judges to depart upwards or downwards from
the guidelines sentence. As noted above, judges in Minnesota depart quite frequently, especially to mitigate sentences, 7 8 so their
discretion does not appear to be unduly limited by charging decisions or overly rigid Guidelines. Because most sentences still re76. For example, Minnesota prosecutors, both before and after the adoption of

the Guidelines, were especially likely to grant charge reductions to offenders at
levels VII through X with low criminal histories. See 1984 CoMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 78 (1978-1983 charge reduction rates). These are the same offenders to whom judges very often grant mitigating departures. See id. at 22-25 (1978-83
prison rates); see also Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 321 (real-offense prison rates,
including both charge and sentence mitigations, show significant leniency given to
first offenders; same is true for conviction-offense prison rates, reflecting only judgecontrolled sentence mitigations).
77. Cf. Tonry, supra note 5, at 136-39 (Federal Guidelines are less flexible than
Minnesota and other state guidelines).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
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flect plea bargaining, a final sentence reflects the joint decisions of
the judge, probation officer, prosecutor, defense attorney, and defendant. The same would not be true, however, if the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines were made more rigid 79 or were replaced
with mandatory minimum penalties (discussed below). Such penalties are often not invoked, but when they are, they really do "tie the
judge's hands" and turn over control of sentencing to the
prosecutor.
Counter-Myth: The Guidelines Still Give Judges Too Much
Discretion
Underlying repeated proposals to adopt mandatory minimum
penaltiesSO is the assumption that this would reduce crime and also
reduce sentencing disparity. Judges would be forced to give more
severe and more uniform sentences to all defendants subject to a
mandatory penalty. In other words, "if presumptive sentences are
good, mandatory sentences are better." Other critics have suggested an alternate, and somewhat more flexible, variation on this
theme, calling for presumptive guidelines to be extended to cover
8
not only prison terms, but also conditions of non-prison sentences. '
That is: "if presumptive guidelines are good, more inclusive presumptive guidelines are even better."
Mandatory minimum prison terms
The reality of mandatory minimum sentences is that they are
seldom "mandatory" in practice.8 2 The inevitable result of these
statutes seems to be that a few unlucky defendants actually receive
the more severe minimum penalties while large numbers of other
defendants escape these penalties through the exercise of discretion
at all levels of the criminal process. Sometimes victims do not report crimes or do not cooperate with prosecutors, out of concern
over harsh penalties; police selectively screen out less serious cases;
prosecutors decline to charge offenses covered by the mandatory
minimum penalties, or agree to drop such charges in return for
guilty pleas; and juries sometimes refuse to convict. The result very
79. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 49, at 924-5 (examples of evasion of overly-rigid
Federal Guidelines by federal judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation
officers).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
81. See Morris & Tonry supra note 48.
82. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINMum PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10-15
(1991); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, 16 Crime & Justice, 243 (1992); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL op DIScRETIoN IN CRIMINAL Jus-

TICE 1950-90 125-26 (1993); BLUMsTEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 30, 188-89.
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often is more disparity not less - some defendants get more severe
punishment, many get the same, and some actually get less.
But what about crime control? Don't severe mandatory minimum penalties deter crime more effectively, and incapacitate dangerous offenders by locking them up for longer? No, not necessarily.
Since "mandatory" penalties operate very selectively, in practice,
they provide little additional incapacitative effect. This is especially true in a state like Minnesota, where the most dangerous repeat violent offenders are already being sentenced to very long
terms (see Part C, infra).
As for the deterrent effect of mandatory minimum penalties, it
must be kept in mind that deterrence is a function not only of severity but also of the certainty and the swiftness with which punishment is delivered.83 Again, studies of mandatory minimum
statutes in other states have found that the first effect of such statutes is to slow down and impede the adjudication process, because
more and more defendants refuse to plead guilty and instead start
asserting every possible defense.84 Thus, as severity increases, certainty as well as swiftness of conviction tends to decrease; unreasonably harsh penalties are evaded by exercises of victim and
official discretion, and more vigorous defense efforts produce more
dismissals and acquittals. If, as some scholars believe,8 5 certainty
and swiftness of punishment are more important deterrent factors
than severity, the overall deterrent effect is unlikely to increase by
much, and might even decrease.
Yet another defect of mandatory minimum sentences is that,
when they are invoked, they allow prosecutors, not judges, to determine sentences.8 6 Prosecutors should not wield unchecked sentencing power because they generally lack the experience, the detailed
pre-sentence investigation report, and greater neutrality which
judges bring to sentencing. Under a mandatory minimum sentencing system, prosecutors have almost unlimited discretion to decide
which defendants they will subject to the mandatory penalties and
which they will allow to escape (because the charge carrying that
penalty is never filed or is dropped in return for the defendant's
guilty plea). As noted above, some critics have complained that sentencing guidelines give prosecutors a similar unchecked power to
dictate sentences and tie judges' hands. Yet this power is far
83. See Low sT AL., supra note 26, at 17.
84. See BLUMsTEIN ET A.,

supra note 29, at 188-89 (reduced conviction rates);

U.S. DEPT. OF JusmcE, Poucy BRmFs -

MANDATORY SENTEN

NG: THE EXPERmNCE

OF Two STATES 8 (1982) (increased delays in trial and conviction).
85. See Low ET AL., supra note 26, at 18, 20.
86. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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greater under mandatory sentences than under presumptive guidelines like those in Minnesota, which allow judges to depart in exceptional cases. Such presumptive guidelines strike a much better
balance between prosecutorial and judicial control.
Non-imprisonment guidelines
While proponents of mandatory minimum sentences have
claimed that the Guidelines' presumptive prison terms are too discretionary, other critics have objected to the Guidelines because
they contain no presumptive rules regulating conditions of nonprison ("stayed") sentences.8 7 Because there is a wide variety of
commonly-used stay conditions (jail, residential or outpatient treatment, community service, fines, restitution, probation, intensive
probation, random drug testing, etc.), any set of guidelines covering
all such conditions would be quite complex. Thus, the most common proposal is simply to regulate the overall severity of stay conditions, providing a range of severity "units" for each guidelines
cell.8 8 A system of "equivalency" scales (or "exchange rates") would
provide that each added stay condition contributes a certain
number of units toward the overall severity score (e.g., each day in
jail adds 1 unit; each day of home detention adds one-half unit;
etc.). 8 9 Judges could select any combination of stay conditions, so
long as the aggregate severity score of all such conditions was
within the range provided for that guidelines cell. Judges could
also "depart" from these ranges, following normal departure criteria
and procedures.
Such a system of aggregate-severity non-imprisonment guidelines might have three kinds of desirable effects: 1) preventing the
imposition of unduly severe stay conditions; 2) limiting the granting of unduly lenient conditions; and 3) encouraging judges to use a
wider variety of stay conditions, especially non-custodial sanctions
such as day-fines and community service.
As applied to the current Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines,
the first effect would be fairly modest, because appellate caselaw
already sets upper limits on the aggregate severity of stay conditions. In State v. Randolph,90 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that defendants have the right to demand execution of the presumptive prison term applicable to their case if that term would be
less onerous than the trial court's proposed stay conditions. The
87. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Momus & ToNRY, supra note 48, at 69-81.

89. Id. at 75.
90. 316 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1982).
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Randolph rule may help to prevent the imposition of excessive stay
conditions, but it does not prevent excessive punishment. When defendants invoke their right to have a sentence executed, the result
is usually9 1 imprisonment in a presumptive-stay case, without compliance with dispositional departure rules (because appellate
courts, under Randolph, review neither the justification for the
trial court's proposed stay conditions, nor the appropriateness of a
prison term). Aggregate severity guidelines would focus attention,
at both trial and appellate levels, on the need for unusually severe
intermediate sanctions in particular cases. Moreover, the
equivalency scales underlying a set of aggregate-severity limits for
each cell would provide more useful guidance to trial and appellate
courts than the vague "onerousness" standard under Randolph.
However upper limits on stay conditions are a "pro-defendant"
reform, and might not garner sufficient support inside and outside
the Minnesota Sentencing Commission unless combined with
lower, i.e., minimum limits on aggregate stay-condition severity.
Yet, such lower limits may not be feasible or even desirable. Unless
they are set very low (which would limit their usefulness and political acceptability), they would raise the following problems.
First, minimum stay-condition limits (unlike maximum limits)
have never been tried in Minnesota and would clearly make sentencing more time-consuming and complex. One of the goals of the
Commission, and an important virtue of its Guidelines, is simplicity
of application. 92 At some point, the costs of further refinement outweigh the benefits. This is particularly likely to occur at the lower
end of the sentencing severity continuum. The relatively low maximum severity of stay conditions under Randolph (equivalent to
prison of 18 months or less, in most cells) limits the potential for
significant disparity and under-punishment.
Second, such limits might often require judges to impose stay
conditions which serve no purpose other than symbolic punishment,
thus wasting scarce correctional resources and violating the Commission's goal of "parsimony" in sentencing (sanctions should be the
least severe necessary to achieve the purposes of the particular sentence). 93 Moreover, each additional stay condition increases the
odds that the defendant will fail to fully comply with all conditions,
and will thus face further (and more expensive) obligations, or even
91. Almost all Randolph requests arise in presumptive-stay cases, but it is possible for the same issue to arise when a judge proposes to depart downward in a presumptive-commitment case.
92. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 281-82.
93. See id. at 282; Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 1342, 1344.
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revocation and imprisonment - all for the sake of symbolic uniformity and proportionality goals, unrelated to public safety.
Third, more severe non-imprisonment sanctions reduce an offender's incentive to comply with on-going, crime-preventive or
treatment-oriented stay conditions by reducing the "reserved" sentencing power of the court when it revokes probation. Such a reduction in sentencing power would occur because the prison-days
equivalent of all completed stay conditions would probably have to
be credited to (deducted from) the duration of the offender's prison
term (just as jail days are currently credited).94 Ironically, very lenient stay conditions give offenders the maximum incentive to cooperate with probation and stay out of trouble, because they face
execution of the entire stayed prison term - an often overlooked,
but highly efficient, form of "specific deterrence."
Fourth, minimum severity standards for stay conditions
would be likely to overload available correctional resources in many
counties, at least from time to time (because caseloads and resource
needs fluctuate much more widely at the county level than in the
larger, statewide system). 95
Fifth, minimum stay condition requirements would eliminate
the modest degree of "local control," which the current Guidelines
provide in less serious cases, and which allows counties to accommodate regional differences not only in resources and crime rates,
but also in sentencing traditions and values.
Sixth, it may prove very difficult to achieve consensus on specific equivalencies for different types of non-prison sanctions. For
example, some have argued that offenders view one day of residential treatment as equivalent to five days in jail,96 whereas judges
and the public may believe that, if anything, treatment hours
should count less than jail time. 97
Finally, minimum stay-condition standards would be very difficult to consistently enforce because most cases of leniency involve
GUIDELINES, supra note 2, III.C.
95. See Hans W. Mattick, The Contemporary Jailsof the United States: An Unknown and Neglected Area of Justice 801-2, in HANDBOOK OF CRnoNOLOGY (Daniel
Glaser, ed., 1974) (need for excess capacity in small jails); MnINESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THREE SPECIAL ISSUES 19-20,

94.

35 (1990) (noting limited correctional resources of many counties).
96. See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 679, 703 (1993).

97. Id. at 703 (a New Jersey Task Force developed an exchange rate of one day in
jail for five days of residential treatment); see also id. at 702 (Oregon Guidelines
initially treated one hour of community service as equivalent to one hour in jail; "few
offenders would agree to exchange three days of work [8 hours a day] for one day [24
hours] of jail").
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agreements with the prosecutors, and are not appealed.98 Even if
the prosecution does object, sentencing appeal of highly fact-dependent issues would rarely be worth a prosecutor's time and expense,
when the only issue is non-imprisonment sanctions (as opposed to
prison commitment and duration).
Given all of these problems, it is not surprising that non-imprisonment guidelines, while often proposed in Minnesota since
1980, have met with almost universal opposition from judges, probation officers, and attorneys. 9 9 This broad resistance provides
perhaps the best "defense" for the Minnesota Sentencing Commission's decision not to promulgate such guidelines. Experience with
the existing prison-term Guidelines has shown that, where officials
in the field strongly oppose Commission policies, the policies have
been evaded. 10 0
As noted previously, a third potential benefit of non-imprisonment guidelines is that they might encourage judges to substitute
non-custodial sentences for jail terms. Equivalency scales for stay
conditions demonstrate in concrete terms that various non-custodial sanctions can be just as "punitive" as custody. But this benefit
(and much of the upper-limit effect, discussed earlier) could be
achieved simply by promulgating the equivalency scales alone,
without specifying either upper or lower limits on aggregate severity per cell. Judges would retain their current discretion, but might
impose fewer custodial sentences. The availability of such
equivalency scales would also help courts to calculate the overall
"onerousness" of proposed stay conditions, under the Randolph line
of cases.
Still, Minnesota should perhaps go further.'O' For instance,
judges could be directed to consider jail or short prison terms as the
punishment of last resort, and could be further required, when imposing a custodial sentence, to state reasons why equally punitive
non-custodial sanctions were not feasible or appropriate. Such
guidelines would be especially helpful if jail or prison terms were
being overused. As discussed more fully in Part C, infra, prison
98. Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 316-19; Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at 752-53.
99. Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at 753.
100. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 337.
101. In addition to the proposal in text, another limited use of stay guidelines
might be for cases in which a mitigated dispositional departure is granted. Imposition of more punitive stay conditions would serve to lessen the disparity between
offenders in the same Guidelines cell who do and do not receive the presumptive
prison term. On the other hand, such cases are exceptional, by definition, and thus
are less suited to any sort of numerical guidelines. Moreover, a requirement to comply with stay guidelines might unduly discourage trial judges from granting appro-

priate mitigating departures.
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terms have always been very sparsely used in Minnesota, but it is
at least arguable that jail terms have been imposed too often. However, a presumption in favor of a non-custodial sentence, backed up
by required reasons and appellate review, would raise some of the
problems previously noted above, in the context of minimum stay
condition standards (e.g., greater complexity, variations in local
conditions). Until further experience is gained in the application of
voluntary equivalency standards (e.g., the day-fine and community
service model recently adopted by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission),l 0 2 it seems unwise to impose across-the-board
stay requirements.
Summary
In my view, the current Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide the right balance between uniformity and flexibility. Attempts
to significantly reduce flexibility and discretion would make the
Guidelines too rigid; if carried too far, such inflexible guidelines
would, like mandatory minimum sentencing laws, simply be
evaded. At the same time, further substantial increases in allowable discretion would risk re-introducing the wide disparities which
led to sentencing guidelines in the first place.
B. Allowable Sentencing Purposes
Myth: The Minnesota Guidelines are too Retributive
Those who increasingly call for greater flexibility in guidelines sentencing sometimes appear to assume that guidelines are
inherently based on a retributive, offense-based, "just deserts"
model which rejects offender-based goals such as rehabilitation and
incapacitation.10 3 The trouble with sentencing guidelines, such
critics argue, is that treatment and supervision in the community
are appropriate in many cases, and may be much cheaper and better for public safety in the long run. Meanwhile, other critics of
guidelines seem to feel that some offenders are especially dangerous, and must be sent to prison for as long as possible, without regard to the limitations of a "justdeserts" model.l04 In other words,
some critics want flexibility to mitigate for rehabilitative purposes;
102. See MnN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 1433 (1993) (describing the day-fine and community service model recently adapted by

the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission).
103. See supra text accompanying note 50.
104. See, e.g., GoVEvIRNa's ComMN oN VioLETr CRsniE, ExzruwvE SinwAY 2
(1991) (proposing that "predatory offenders" convicted of certain violent crimes be
sentenced under a separate sentencing grid, including provisions for life without
parole).
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others want greater authority to selectively lengthen sentences, to
incapacitate.
Both of these criticisms reflect a serious misunderstanding of
existing sentencing guidelines, particularly those in Minnesota. No
existing guidelines system, state or federal, is premised entirely on
a retributive theory of punishment, or entirely rejects rehabilitation
and incapacitation as sentencing goals. The Minnesota Sentencing
Commission has stated that its Guidelines are based on a "modified
just deserts" theory, and some writers have sought to strongly emphasize the retributive aspect of the Guidelines (see below). However, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines themselves clearly
reject any extreme "just deserts" theory, and the importance of rehabilitative and incapacitative purposes has grown steadily under
the Guidelines since their inception.
About seventy-five percent of defendants sentenced under the
Guidelines have presumptive non-prison ("stayed") sentences. In
these cases, the Guidelines explicitly recognize that all traditional
goals of punishment, including both rehabilitation and incapacitation, may be considered by the sentencing court in setting conditions of the stayed sentence. In addition, as noted above,1 0 5 the use
of criminal history scores under the Guidelines implicitly recognizes both rehabilitative and incapacitative theories.
Finally, appellate caselaw and post-implementation legislation have both increased the role of rehabilitation and incapacitation. Caselaw under the Guidelines recognizes that, in exceptional
cases, courts have the power to depart from presumptive prison or
non-prison disposition based upon individualized assessments of an
offender's amenability to probation. Thus, a defendant with a presumptive prison-commitment sentence may still receive a nonprison sentence if the court finds that he or she is particularly amenable to probation (a high proportion of these cases involve first offenders).' 0 6 Conversely, a defendant with a presumptive stayedprison sentence may, in exceptional cases, be sent to prison if the
court finds that the defendant is not amenable to probation (usually
because the defendant previously failed to cooperate with
probation). 107
105. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
106. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 324-28; Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at 74048. For a discussion of a similar line of cases under the Federal Guidelines, see Richard S. Frase, Defendant Amenability to Treatment or Probationas a Basis for Departure Under the Minnesota and Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 328 (1991) [hereinafter Frase 1991b].
107. See, e.g., State v. Park, 305 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981), discussed in Frase
1991a, supra note 3, at 741, 743-45, 747.

1993]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Similarly, the Minnesota Legislature has increasingly enacted
new sentencing laws to incapacitate particularly dangerous offenders, and has given more and more explicit recognition to treatment
and incapacitation goals.1 0 s Such legislation is troubling because it
has the potential of re-introducing significant sentencing disparities and causing prison overcrowding, and also tends to undermine
the Minnesota Sentencing Commission's independence and control
over sentencing policy. However, these adverse effects have not yet
become a serious problem because the Legislature has thus far limited the new sentencing laws to narrowly-defined and low-volume
categories of offenders.
Counter-Myth: The Guidelines are not Retributive Enough
Some supporters of guidelines sentencing view all of these
caselaw and legislative developments with alarm. They believe
that sentencing ought to be purely retributive and offense-based,
and that any recognition of crime prevention goals and offenderbased sentencing is anathema.1 0 9 They have argued that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were initially successful because of
their strong emphasis on "just deserts;" a single, dominant sentencing purpose supposedly lends greater coherence to the drafting and
implementation of sentencing rules.110 These critics might also argue that, in selecting a single purpose, "just deserts" is the best
choice because offender-based, utilitarian goals such as rehabilitation and incapacitation are more likely to lead to disparity, permitting judges to favor white, middle-class offenders over racial
minorities and the poor. Alternately, some of these critics may
have assumed that, if sentencing is to become less discretionary,
then it must, of necessity, become more retributive - in other
words, that offender-based, utilitarian sentencing requires discretion, while retributive sentencing does not.
The latter proposition is clearly false; reduced sentencing discretion does not inevitably require either greater emphasis on retributive goals or rejection of utilitarian aims. Discretion serves all
traditional purposes of punishment. With respect to "just deserts,"
broad discretion allows courts to consider all aggravating and mitigating culpability factors, in order to "make the punishment fit the
crime.""' Conversely, reduced discretion limits the power of a
108. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 360-63.
109. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., PARENT, supra note 3, at 34-39.
111. See Frase 1991b, supra note 106, at 332; Alschuler, supra note 49, at 902,
909-10; Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 1339. The sentencing goal which probably
requires the least individualized discretion is general deterrence, Id. at 1341, at
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court to fine-tune its retributive as well as its utilitarian
assessments.
It is equally false to assume that the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines were, at their inception at least, primarily retributive,
or that their success was due to their retributive nature. As I have
argued at greater length elsewhere,"l 2 the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines have always been a hybrid, giving substantial weight to
offender-based, utilitarian sentencing goals as well as to "just
deserts." This also appears to be what the Legislature intended
originally"3 (and, as noted above, still does). Moreover, a recent
assessment of successes and failures of the Guidelines since their
inception concluded that the Commission's attempt to emphasize
retributive values - to give more weight to offense seriousness,
and less to offender variables - was relatively unsuccessful even in
the early years of the Guidelines, particularly in the sentencing of
114
first offenders.
Despite what the Commission and certain "justdeserts" theorists said about sentencing philosophy, the fact is that the original
Guidelines did very little to reduce the role of utilitarian, offenderbased sentencing. Based on pre-Guidelines patterns of offense and
prior record, over 80 percent of felons sentenced under the new
rules were expected to receive a presumptive stayed-prison sentence."l 5 The conditions of these stays (and decisions to revoke the
stay) were to be determined according to all traditional purposes of
punishment. The most important role of retributive values in such
cases was to determine the duration of the presumptive stayedprison term. (Retributive values apparently did not underlie presumptive stayed-prison dispositions; if the Commission believed
that prison-commitment was "undeserved" in such cases, it should
have required stay revocations (as well as aggravated dispositional
departures) to be based on findings of culpable conduct by the defendant, and should not have allowed judges to continue to base
these decisions on "technical violations' (non-criminal conduct) and
other indicia of "unamenability" to probation.))
For the remaining one-fifth of defendants, the presumptive
prison-commit disposition and narrow durational range could be
least if one rejects "exemplary" sentences as too unfair or disparate. Cf. Norval Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in ZnMING & FRASE, supra note 29, at
736, 741 (arguing that occasional, very severe penalties, intended "to capture public
attention and to deter... by a dramatic punishment," are not unjust).

112.
113.
114.
115.

See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 352-54.
Id. at 34B-9.
Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 299, 301-3, 319-26, 335, 337.
1978 DIsPosmIONAL DATA SET. This data is described in 1984 CoMMIssIoN
REPORT, supra note 3, at 20, and in 1980 CoMIssioN REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
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viewed as primarily based on retributive values. However, the
Guidelines do not state that departures from these terms must be
based on retributive grounds, nor did the Commission initially, or
subsequently, take any steps to insure that these presumptive
terms are not evaded or distorted by prosecutorial charging or plea
bargaining decisions based on utilitarian grounds. Thus, even the
strongest "just deserts" advocates on the Commission must have realized that, in practice, utilitarian considerations would continue to
strongly influence the vast majority of felony sentences in
Minnesota.
Given the pervasive influence of utilitarian, offender-based
sentencing goals under the original Guidelines, and the increasing
importance of these goals in light of subsequent appellate caselaw
and legislation (described above), it would not be surprising to find
increased evidence of sentencing disparity and race or class bias.
However, as discussed later in this Article,l1 6 evaluations of the
early post-Guidelines years found that such disparity and bias had
been significantly reduced in comparison to pre-Guidelines sentencing. Furthermore, a recent evaluation of sentencing patterns in the
late 1980s 117 found surprisingly little evidence of bias in sentencing, even in the application of such race and class-sensitive criteria
as "amenability" to probation.
Summary
The genius of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is that
they have found a way to accommodate all of the traditional goals
of sentencing. The Guidelines recognize upper, and occasionally
lower,"l8 retributive limits on sentencing severity (and thereby also
increase uniformity), while still allowing courts to consider rehabilitative and incapacitative purposes. The Guidelines, as originally
written, actually reflected more of a "limiting" than a "defining" retributive scheme.1 9 They have further evolved into a hybrid which
is more balanced than the Commission's original "modified just
deserts" model, and is also more likely to survive. The public and
criminal justice officials in Minnesota (and elsewhere) are strongly
committed to pursuing crime control sentencing goals. If guidelines
116. See infra text accompanying notes 147-164.
117. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 308-16, 326-28.
118. Upper limits are set by the Guidelines durational ranges, which are infrequently exceeded. See supra, text accompanying notes 65-67. As for lower limits,
the patterns of dispositional departures indicate that judges believe some violent
offenses must almost always receive a prison term. See Frase 1991a, supra note 3,
at 746-47 n.90.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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do not openly accommodate these goals, they will be evaded or
rejected.
C. Sentencing Severity
Myth: Minnesota Guidelines Sentences are too Lenient
Underlying recurring calls for mandatory prison sentences,
longer prison terms, and stricter conditions of non-prison sentences,
is the assumption that sentencing is very lenient in Minnesota.
The reality is rather different from this assumption, and leniency, of course, is a relative term. So the question is, lenient compared to what? Compared with sentences under the old
indeterminate system in Minnesota, and with the most recent data
on sentences in other states, the Guidelines' sentences for violent
crimes - the crimes which most acutely concern the public and
elected officials - are quite severe and always have been.
Sentences for non-violent crimes are less severe, although a very
high percentage of offenders receive local jail sentences. These patterns are consistent with the Minnesota Sentencing Commission's
policy decision to reserve scarce and expensive state prison space
0
for violent offenders.12
For the most serious, violent offenses (those ranked at severity
levels seven, e.g., armed robbery, or higher), both the percentage of
offenders receiving prison terms, and the average duration of imprisonment prior to parole release, increased under the Guidelines.
In 1981, the first year of the Guidelines, the prison rate increased
11 percent and the average prison time-served increased by five
percent.121 From 1981 to 1988, the prison rate for high severity
offenses fell by 14 percent (due in part to an increase in certain
high-probation crimes such as child sex abuse), 122 but the average
prison time-served increased by 22 percent, 12 3 thus increasing
overall "weighted" severity (prison frequency times average dura120. See 1984 CoMMssIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 21; 1980 CoMMlSsION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 9-10, 15.
121. 1978 Dispositional and Durational Data Sets, supra note 10; 1981 In-Depth
Data Set, supra note 10. These comparisons are based on alleged-offense data, not
conviction offense, to avoid distortions caused by major charging changes under the
Guidelines, see Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 299-303. It should also be noted that
the pre-Guidelines (1978) data on sentence durations is actual time served in prison,
whereas post-Guidelines durations are estimated by assuming that offenders will

earn the maximum good-time reduction. Thus, all post-Guidelines durations are un-

derstated, although probably not by much. See 1984 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, at 101 (median good-time days "lost" varied from 4.5 to 22, depending on
sentence length).
122. MiNN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, 1988 DATA SuMMARY 1, 7 (1990).
123. 1988 Data Set, supra note 10; 1981 Evaluation Data Set, supra note 10.
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tion) by about four percent. As of 1991, prison rates had fallen even
further, but sentence durations had increased substantially, yielding an increase in overall weighted severity of about 13 percent
since 1988 (and 18 percent, since 1981).124
In comparison with other states, Minnesota sends a lower percentage of felons to prison. According to the most recent national
survey, 44 percent of felons received a prison term in 1988,125 compared to about 20 percent of Minnesota felons.126 But again, this
difference is mainly confined to sentencing of non-violent crimes,
where other states use prison sentences and Minnesota more often
uses short jail terms.12 7 For the most serious violent crimes, Minnesota prison rates are equal to or higher than the national average. For example, the same national survey found that in 1988, 91
percent of defendants found guilty of murder or non-negligent manslaughter were sentenced to prison nationally,128 while in Minnesota the percentage varied between 95 and 99 percent, in 1988
through 1991.129 Moreover, Minnesota average prison durations
for these homicide offenses were much longer than the national average: from 35 to 100 percent longer, depending on the year and the
conservativeness of parole release estimates. 130 As for forcible
rape, the national study reported that 69 percent of defendants
were sentenced to prison in 1988.131 In Minnesota, the percentages
in 1988 through 1991 varied between 77 and 85 percent.132 The
average prison duration for rape was somewhat shorter in Minnesota than the average for all states, but this would be expected,
124. 1991 Data Set, supra note 10.
125. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1988, Table 2 (1990).
126. Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 331-32.
127. By one measure - overall felony custody rates (prison or jail sentence) Minnesota is much more severe than the national average: 85 percent of felons sentenced in 1991 received an executed custody sentence. 1991 DATA SUMMARY, supra
note 10, at 5-6. In contrast, a recent national survey found that only 69 percent of
felons received either a prison or a jail sentence. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note
125, at 2, Table 2.
128. Id. (murder category contains non-negligent manslaughter).
129. 1988 through 1991 Evaluation Data Sets, supra note 10. The latter data
excludes life sentences, which are not covered by the Guidelines. Data on the
number of such inmates received in prison each year was obtained from Mr. Kenneth
E. Larimore, Information and Analysis Unit, Minnesota Department of Corrections.
130. Id. In computing these durations, it was necessary to estimate the time each
inmate would serve. For Guidelines sentences, it was assumed that all inmates
would receive the maximum Good-Time reduction (1/3 off). However, for life
sentences imposed after 1988, it was not possible to identify which inmates in the
total for each year were covered by the 30-year minimum term applicable as of August 1, 1989 (for crimes committed before that date, the minimum term was 17
years).
131. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 2, Table 2.
132. 1988 through 1991 Evaluation Data Sets, supra note 10.
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given the higher prison rate - imprisonment of more marginal offenders tends to lower the average duration of terms (and vice
versa). Overall rape sentencing severity (prison frequency times
33
duration) in Minnesota is about equal to the national average.1
Counter-Myth: Guidelines Sentences are too Severe
Attempts to refute the first criticism, above, unfortunately
tend to give support to the counter-charge that guideline sentencing
is too severe. Indeed, some critics have argued that the greater visibility of guidelines or other determinate sentencing reforms inevitably attracts politically-motivated upward "adjustments" in
sanction severity, which can no longer be quietly undercut by later
parole release discretion.13 4 This "visibility-vulnerability" problem
has even led some critics to argue for a return to the old parole1 35
release system.
It is probably true that increased pressures to escalate severity are inherent in any more uniform sentencing scheme. The goal
of uniformity (as well as the separate concerns for openness and
honesty in sentencing) would seem to require the promulgation of
written standards, and such standards cannot long be kept secret
from victims, politicians, and the media. Yet if this is true, then the
return of the Parole Board would not solve the visibility-vulnerability problem: in an age of required governmental openness and accountability, parole boards would have to devise - and publish some sort of parole-release guidelines, which would be just as visible and vulnerable as the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Nor is
there any reason to assume that a re-established Parole Board
would be more wise or more insulated from political pressures than
the Minnesota Sentencing Commission. For better or worse, we are
probably stuck with the visibility-vulnerability problem. We cannot
put the sentencing reform genie back in the bottle.
But the defense of Minnesota's approach need not rest merely
on claims that it is no worse than the parole system. We need to
put things in perspective: in a period when national jail and prison
populations were going through the roof,136 and crime rates were
133. It is not possible at this time to evaluate the relative severity of Minnesota
sentencing for other violent crimes (e.g., robbery, assault), due to lack of sufficiently
comparable offense definitions and charging practices across jurisdictions.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
135. See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.
723, 729 (1993).
136. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN, PisONERS IN 1992 1, Table 2 (1993) (168 percent increase in prison inmates, from 1980
to 1992); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTCE, BUaEAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ]BULLETIN, JAIL IN-
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increasing rapidly in Minnesota, sentencing severity under the
Guidelines remained remarkably stable, and increases in severity
were rarely the result of politically-motivated adjustments in
Guidelines terms. As noted above, sentencing of violent offenders
became more severe, but this was originally the Commission's policy, not the Legislature's, and it would seem to be the most rational
use of scarce and expensive prison space. The increases were also
fairly gradual. Most of the increases in violent crime penalties did
not occur until 1989, almost a decade after the Guidelines went into
effect. Even if one believes (as I do), that the 1989 increases were
unnecessary and unwise, they were at least understandable: vio37
lent-crime arrests had more than doubled since the early 1980s.1
Furthermore, to the extent that punitive attitudes increase with increasing racial tensions (as offenders come to be seen as "them," not
"us"), it should be noted that ethnic diversity was increasing dramatically in Minnesota during this period; the non-white population doubled in the 1980s, and the non-white proportion of
sentenced felons was also increasing steadily - from 18 percent, in
1981, to 30 percent, in 1991.138
If one looks at the broader picture, overall sentencing severity
has remained remarkably stable. The percentage of convicted
felons sentenced to state prison has held steady at about 20 percent
since the mid-70s, and the average duration of prison time served
hovered around 25 months from 1980 through 1989.139
More and more felons were receiving jail sentences as a condition of probation: while only 35 percent of all convicted felons received jail sentences in 1978, this figure had risen to 58 percent by
1988, and 66 percent, by 1991.140 But this steep rise in jail sentencing since 1978 is not strong evidence for the "visibility-vulnerability" hypothesis. First of all, jail sentences under the Guidelines are
imposed by judges, with practically no direct guidance from either
the Commission or the Legislature. Second, the gradual increase in
the use of jail sentences appears to have begun before the GuideMATEs1992 2, Table 1 (1993) (number of jail inmates more than doubled from 1982
to 1992). See also infra, text accompanying note 144.

137. Adult arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery and
aggravated assault went up 105 percent, from 1983 to 1988 (most of this increase
was in aggravated assaults - up 137 percent; lesser assaults were up even more:
157 percent). Adult drug arrests had also increased substantially since 1983 - up
57 percent. (Data obtained from Mr. Ray Lewis, Research Analyst, Statistical Anal-

ysis Center, Minnesota Planning Office.)
138. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DECENNIAL CENSUS OF POPULATION 1980
(1981); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DECENNIAL CENSUS OF POPULATION 1990 (1991);
1991 DATA SuMMARY, supra note 10, at 10 (conviction data).
139. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 332.
140. 1991 DATA SuMMARY, supra note 10, at 21.
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lines went into effect. 14 1 Third, most of the increase in jail
sentences in the first year of the Guidelines occurred in cases with
presumptive non-prison sentences, as judges substituted jail for the
prison terms they had formerly imposed (thus producing a net decrease in sentencing severity in these cases). 14 2 Fourth, some of the
increase in the jail rate through the late 1980s may have derived
from an increase in the average seriousness of felony cases. 143 With
limited prison space, and a strong Commission policy of avoiding
prison overcrowding (discussed below), jail sentencing would be expected to increase.
Finally, the broadest measure of punitiveness - total inmate
populations in prisons and jails relative to arrest rates - showed
virtually no change in Minnesota, from the mid-1970s through 1991
(whereas, for the nation as a whole, overall custodial sentencing severity increased by about 80 percent).144 Thus, it appears that increased felony jail sentencing must have been balanced by a
decrease in the use of jails for pretrial detention and/or misdemeanor sentencing - again, a very defensible use of limited jail
space, and one which is consistent with the Commission's sense of
custodial priorities.
Still, as noted before, the pressures to "adjust" highly visible
guideline sentences upward are inherent, and will continue to
plague the Minnesota Guidelines - or any other foreseeable sentencing scheme. Uniformity, openness, and accountability are appropriate, widely-held values, and they are here to stay. The best
we can do is to try to make these values work in favor of more rational sentencing: for example, by making sure that legislators and
other elected policy-makers receive full information about the costs
of proposed severity increases compared with less costly alternatives, and are forced to take responsibility for the long-term consequences and costs (including increased disparity) 145 of their
141. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 332.
142. Among alleged offense presumptive non-prison cases, prison terms decreased

by 10 percent and jail terms increased by 11 percent, from 1978 to 1981. 1978 and
1981 Evaluation Data Sets, supra note 10.
143. The mean offense severity and criminal history score of sentenced felons increased by 7 and 51 percent, respectively, from 1981 to 1989, and the percentage of
Guidelines cases with presumptive prison-commitment sentences increased from 15
percent, in 1981, to 25 percent in 1989. 1981 and 1989 Evaluation Data Sets, supra
10.
144. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelinesin Minnesota and OtherAmerican States:A ProgressReport, in (Oxford Univ. Pr., forthcoming 1994), figure 7. See
also id., figure 6 (between 1978 and 1992, increases in total prison and jail inmate

populations in Minnesota closely paralleled increases in the number of felony cases
sentenced).
145. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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punitive proposals. As discussed more fully below, this information-and-accountability function is one of the most important roles
of a sentencing commission.
Summary
It is impossible to completely satisfy all critics, particularly in
as politically sensitive as sentencing severity. The best we
area
an
is
can do attempt to reach an acceptable and relatively stable compromise. Viewed in this light and considering both the galloping
increases in sentencing severity in other states, and Minnesota's
recent dramatic increases in violent and drug crimes, increases in
sentencing severity under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
have been very modest and quite gradual. Moreover, these increases have occurred primarily in cases of violent crimes, which is
consistent with the Minnesota Sentencing Commission's policies.
HI.

Appreciating What the Minnesota Guidelines have
Achieved

In the remainder of this article, I would like to highlight what
I believe are the three most significant accomplishments of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.146 These accomplishments are
well known to most informed observers, or once were. But, recent
criticisms suggest that we all need a reminder.
A.

Reducing Sentencing Disparityand Racial Bias

Early studies of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines found
that they were successful in making sentences more uniform for offenders with similar conviction offense and prior records.14 7 My
own studies of the evolution of the Guidelines through the late
1980s confirm that they continue to be effective in reducing sentencing disparity, particularly in minimizing disparities related to
race. 148
146. Other important goals of the Guidelines are increased proportionality; openness and honesty of sentencing decisions; simplicity of application; and "parsimony"
(using the least severe sanction needed in each case). See Frase 1993a, supra note 3,

at 281-2.
147. See Miethe & Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities,supra note 3, at 352-55 (table 2).

148. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 308-16, 326-28. The data sets available for
the latter study included race but not social class variables; to the extent that the
latter variables are strongly correlated with race (i.e., if minorities tend to have consistently lower levels of employment, education, income, etc.), then the minority
"race" variables studied reflected the combined effects of race and social class. A
failure to find statistically significant effects for these "race" variables thus implies
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When I began to study the extensive computerized data on
cases sentenced under the Guidelines, I expected to find that the
discretionary choices still permitted under the Guidelines tended to
favor white offenders. In particular, I expected to see such favoritism in mitigating and aggravating departures from the Guidelines'
imprisonment rules,149 and in the largely unregulated discretionary decisions to impose jail as a condition of a non-prison sentence.15 0 Instead, I found that none of these types of decisions
revealed evidence of substantial racial disparity.'15 Thus, although
a lower percentage of blacks receive mitigating departures, this difference disappears when one takes into account other factors which
traditionally determine the severity of punishment: factors such as
the nature and seriousness of conviction offenses; whether the offender was on probation or parole at the time of an offense; defendants' prior records of convictions; and whether a defendant pled
guilty. To the extent that there is any consistent bias evident in
recent Guidelines sentencing, it appears to be directed against the
unemployed, of all races,15 2 and against males, which in part probably reflects leniency toward women with dependent children.153
In May 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court released a report
54
concluding that there is still racial bias in felony sentencing.'
Given the long history of overt as well as covert racial discrimination in this country, including Minnesota,' 5 5 this finding is not surprising. But for present purposes, the important questions are
narrower: how much bias is there in felony sentencing, and is it less
than what existed before the Guidelines? The Minnesota Supreme
Court's study did not address the latter question, but as noted
above, earlier researchers found that race bias decreased under the
Guidelines.
that the correlated social class variables, if measured independently, would also not
be significant.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 (explaining the different types of
departure and the percentages of sentences that receive each type of departure).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 87 and 115.
151. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 310 (table 2), 313 (table 3), 315 (table 4),
327 (table 8).
152. See Debra L. Dailey, Prison and Race in Minnesota, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 761,
774 (table 6) (1993).
153. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 315-316.
154. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RAcIL BIAS iN THE JuDicIAL
SYSTEM, FiNAL REPORT S-19 (1993) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
155. See, e.g., Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials:A Study in
Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REv. 13 (1990) (showing bias existed in handling of
Dakota Uprising trials in 1880s); Larry Oakes, A Lynching in Duluth: Residents
Taking Steps to Heal 71 Year-Old Wounds, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Oct. 26, 1991,
at 1A (recounting story of lynching of three black youths in Duluth in the 1920s).
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As for the degree of bias in sentencing, the supreme court's
study actually found that statistically significant racial disparity
only existed for certain sentencing decisions (prison commitment)
involving certain offenses (forcible rape, aggravated robbery and
second degree (armed) assault),'5 6 and was not present in prison
duration decisions or in the imposition of jail sentences in felony
cases.' 5 7 Even as to prison commitment, racial disparity was much
greater in one year (1990) than over a longer time period (198691).158 It should be noted further that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's studies generally did not evaluate socio-economic variables
strongly correlated with race (e.g., employment at time of sentencing),' 5 9 which can have a disparate impact on minorities. Sentencing based on such variables might still be viewed as class bias, but
it is not a case of racial bias per se; indeed, some minority offenders
benefit from consideration of such factors. 160 Finally, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's studies controlled for conviction offense within statutory offense categories, and did not
examine individual case files to determine whether aggravating
and mitigating factors (e.g., injury to the victim; repetition of the
same crime) might justify different treatment of seemingly similar
cases. 161

Of course, Minnesotans must continue to be vigilant and to
guard against racial bias in sentencing, especially in a period of increasing ethnic diversity and heightened public concern over
crime.16 2 Officials and researchers must also seek to identify and
eliminate reasons why so many more minority offenders have more
severe conviction offenses and more substantial criminal histories,
thus giving them more severe presumptive sentences. 16 3 Finally,
156. Significant racial disparity was also found in a third category, "weapons offenses," but this category overlaps with (i.e., includes) armed robbery offenses. TASK

FORCE REPoRT, supra note 154, at Appendix D4, 7-13 (Analysis of Sentencing Guidelines 1986-1990: Imprisonment Rates and Departure Data for Minnesota Felons).
157. Id. at 5-6 (prison duration); id. at Appendix D-2, 18-19 (jail sentences).
158. Id. at 7-13. See also David Peterson and Paul Gustafson, Accuracy or Advocacy? Bias Report Challenged, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), June 27, 1993, at 1B (discussing differences).
159. See supra note 148 and text accompanying note 152.
160. See Dailey, supra note 152, at 774, table 6 (mitigating departure rate for
employed African Americans was 82 percent, compared to only 70 percent for employed White offenders).
161. The Sentencing Guidelines Commission's in-depth analysis of 1981 and 1982
sentences found that factors justifying an aggravated departure were more often
present in cases involving minority offenders. 1984 CoMnmssioN REPORT, supra note
3, at 66-67.
162. See supra notes 57, 138.
163. Cf. Alfred Blunmstein, Racial Disproportionalityof U.S. Prison Populations
Revisited, 64 U. CoLO. L. REv. 743, 754, 759 (1993) (arguing that nonwhites are
represented in prison far out of proportion to their numbers in the general popula-
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the Commission may need to revisit the difficult issues of how to
treat factors such as an offender's employment status (which has a
disparate impact on minorities) and child custody responsibility
(which tends to favor female offenders). The Guidelines clearly
state that departures may not be based on such factors. Judges,
attorneys and probation officers seem to disagree. Perhaps renewed efforts should be made to rule out such factors, although this
would hurt some minorities and many women and children.164 Yet
in addressing these issues, and in striving to maintain and improve
sentencing fairness, everyone should recognize and appreciate the
greater degree of racial neutrality which has already been achieved
under the Guidelines, and which would be lost if the Guidelines
were repealed or made more discretionary.
B. Avoiding Prison Overcrowding and Court Intervention
Although sentencing guidelines are usually seen primarily as
a means of reducing sentencing disparity, an equally important
function of guidelines is to permit states to more accurately predict
future prison populations, and thus avoid serious overcrowding.16 5
Overcrowded prisons are dangerous and self-defeating, breeding
more crime than they prevent.166 Overcrowding also forces states
to adopt desperate, "back-door" release programs 16 7 (thus undercutting the certainty and honesty of punishment), and eventually
tion - especially in northern, "liberal" states, such as Minnesota; this disparity is
mostly due to fact that minorities have much higher arrest rates for serious offenses,
subject to long prison terms).

164. See Dailey supra note 152 (showing minorities sometimes benefit from mitigation accorded to employed offenders).
Disparity reduction often means "levelling up" rather than down. For example,
in 1991 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that under the state constitution, crack
cocaine offenders could not be punished more severely than powdered cocaine offenders, because the former are mostly minority offenders while the latter are mostly
white. The Minnesota Legislature promptly "solved" this disparity problem by raising all powder penalties to equal those for crack, thus making penalties more uniform, but also more severe for offenders (including minorities) charged with
powdered cocaine offenses. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 363.
165. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 372-73; Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 32933; Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at 733-36.
166. See, e.g., Steve Lerner, Rule of the Cruel: How Violence is Built Into
America's Prisons,NEw REPurnIc, October 15, 1984, at 17-21 (describing violent conditions in overcrowded prisons); Mattick, supra note 95, at 801 (as jails become more
crowded they become increasingly less secure, and also less sanitary).
167. See FloridaCourt System Puts Criminals Back on Streets, Officials and Citizens Say, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 27, 1993, at 9A (recent rash of fatal attacks
on tourists is due in part to early release of thousands of violent offenders, due to
overcrowding).
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leads to expensive litigation and court interventions in prison
administration. 16 8
Although Minnesota prison populations have doubled since
the Guidelines went into effect, the increase has occurred slowly
enough to stay within expanding capacity and avoid serious over16 9
crowding and double-bunking of maximum-security inmates.
During the same period, prison populations at the national level
increased by 168 percent, resulting in very serious prison overcrowding, routine multiple-bunking, and court intervention in most
states.170
As prisons become more and more overcrowded, they become
less and less safe. Some people may not care very much what prisoners do to each other, although everyone ought to at least care
what they do to prison guards and staff. But, we must recognize
that almost all of these prisoners will eventually be released back
into society. As prisons become more violent and uncontrolled, the
prisoners they release back into society become more likely to continue and even escalate their criminal behavior. An old Civil Rights
protest song, "Here I am in This Low Down Jail," put it succinctly:
Oh, listen, Cap'n, want you to know, 1
17
You got to reap jes' what you sow.

Nor should any state welcome the disruption and cost of long-term
federal court intervention in prison administration.
Thus, it is no surprise that, since the late 1980s, more and
more states have adopted Minnesota-type guidelines as a means of
predicting and controlling the growth of prison populations. Presumptive sentencing guidelines, because they limit the discretion of
judges and correctional authorities, allow states to make much
more accurate predictions of how many offenders will be committed
to prison in a given time period, and how long they will remain in
72
prison. Although such predictions are necessarily imprecise,1
Minnesota's experience shows that they are accurate enough to per168. See U.S. GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE, PRISON CROWDING: IssuEs FACING

THE NATION'S PRISON SYsTEMs 29 (1989) (as of April 1989, 35 states and the District
of Columbia faced court orders dealing with prison overcrowding).
169. See Richard S. Frase, Prison Population Growing Under Minnesota Guidelines, 4 OVERCROWDED TmEs, Feb., 1993, at 1, 12.
170. See supra note 136 (indicating inmate population increases); Frase 1993a,
supra note 3, at 330, table 9 (overcrowding); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 168, at 29 (court orders and/or consent degrees related to overcrowding
had been issued in 35 states, as of April 1989).
171. Lawrence Gellert, Here l Am in This Low Down Jail, NEGRO SONGS OF PROTEST (American Music League, 1936), quoted in RONALD GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHErro 1 (1975).
172. See Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at 734-35.
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mit prison construction, expansion, and other adjustments to keep
ahead of rising prison populations.
C. Promoting More Informed and Balanced Sentencing
Policy
The third major advantage of commission-based sentencing
guidelines results from the commission structure itself. Although
sentencing commissions are ultimately responsible to the legislature and to the people of a state, they do not face the immediate
electoral pressures which confront legislators. Thus, they are less
likely to be unduly swayed by the sort of public hysteria which periodically occurs following a series of particularly violent and highly
publicized crimes.1 73 Some critics of commission-based guidelines
might consider this lack of immediate political responsiveness and
accountability to be a defect,174 but the same criticism could be
made of other forms of intentional unresponsiveness which are part
of our democratic system - for example, the system of checks and
balances between different branches of government, and the elaborate procedures required to amend the constitution. Sometimes,
the wisest course of action is to resist an immediate hue and cry,
and to take a long-term view of problems and their possible
solutions.
Another major advantage of the commission concept is that,
like other specialized administrative agencies, a commission can
conduct extensive research and develop an overall plan which is
balanced, internally consistent, and fully recognizes the complexity
of the issues. Thus, as noted above, the Commission was able to
create and refine the first state-wide prison population prediction
model. This model allows the Commission to warn the legislature
of the need to increase prison capacity, and also lets elected officials, their constituents, and the Commission know immediately
what eventual prison population consequences will result from any
proposed change in sentencing rules. As suggested earlier, this
"early warning system" is a key ingredient in forcing elected officials to admit and take responsibility for the costs of politically-mo175
tivated sentencing proposals.
173. See Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at 729-30; VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 74,
at 7.
174. See generally John C. Coffee, Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEORGETOWN L. REv. 975, 1042 (1978).
175. Cf. CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFYEcTrvE CRIME POLICY, ANATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF VIOLENT AND OTHER SERIOUS CRIME: SUMMARY OF REC-

OMMENDATIONS (1990) (recommending all proposed federal crime legislation should
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In addition to its prison population projections, the Commission has also monitored all sentences and departures under the
Guidelines and has carried out more detailed research on sentencing in particular types of cases. Were it not for budget limitations,
the Commission also might have conducted additional research on
topics such as prosecutor charging and plea bargaining; 17 6 factors
behind recent increases in felony caseloads and supervised release
revocations; 177 equivalency scales and other ways of encouraging
judges to use non-custodial sanctions; 178 and a whole host of other
matters which properly bear on sentencing policy.
The Commission has not, thus far, conducted such broad-scale
research, and actually has had difficulty doing the minimum
amount of research necessary to perform its functions. The sad reality is that Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines reform has been run
on a shoestring budget. Indeed, the Commission's budget has been
reduced over the years. 179 Moreover, the legislature also has
shown an increasing tendency to take back some of the delegated
responsibility for setting sentencing policy. In 1989, for example,
the Legislature ordered the Commission to increase presumptive
sentences for certain offenses by specified amounts. 18 0 There also
has been a tendency to blame the Guidelines Commission for doing
exactly what the 1978 enabling statute directed it to do: avoid
prison overcrowding.iS1
All of these trends - chronic underfunding, legislative micromanagement of sentencing guidelines policy, and retreat from the
state's long-standing commitment to a responsible prison policy threaten to undermine the Commission's independence and its continued ability to control sentencing disparity and prison overcrowding. Of these trends, the reduced concern about prison capacity
limits is particularly troubling. It suggests that some legislators
are willing to engage in "credit card sentencing policy" - the enactment of severe penalties with no consideration of whether the state
has, or will ever have, money available to pay for them. Such irrebe required to contain a fiscal impact statement, showing projected effects on court
and probation caseloads, prison populations and crime).
176. See Frase 1993a, supra note 3, at 303, 335 n.130 (arguing need for better
"real offense" data).
177. See Frase, supra note 169, at 10.
178. See supra, text accompanying notes 101-102.
179. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 369, 376-77; Frase 1991a, supra note 3, at

753.
180. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 361.
181. See Frase 1993b, supra note 3, at 349. In 1989, the Legislature amended the
Guidelines enabling act to specify that the Commission's primary consideration in
setting sentencing policy should be public safety, not existing resources. Id.
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sponsible sentencing proposals seem particularly ironic at a time
when we are all trying to recover from the disastrous consequences
of the debt-ridden 80s.
IV.

Conclusion

Fifteen years ago, Minnesota led the nation in sentencing reform and showed that Commission-based, presumptive guidelines
can effectively reduce disparity, avoid prison overcrowding, and
promote more informed and balanced sentencing.
Lately, some critics seem to have forgotten these advantages,
and have called for overhaul or repeal of the Guidelines. As I have
argued in this article, many of the most common criticisms are
based on misconceptions, and are mutually inconsistent. The Minnesota guidelines are neither unduly rigid nor too loose; they limit
discretion, but still provide plenty of flexibility to tailor sentences to
the needs of an individual case,' 8 2 based not only on "just deserts"
but also on rehabilitative and incapacitative goals.18 3 Nor are the
Guidelines either excessively lenient or unreasonably severe. Sentencing severity has increased for violent crimes. But reduced severity in the sentencing of less serious cases has allowed Minnesota
to maintain a stable rate of incarceration relative to its crime rate
- while the rest of the country has experienced dramatic increases
in sentencing severity.' 8 4 Finally, it should not be assumed that
the frequent and diverse criticisms reflect deep-seated problems
with the Guidelines, or the need for fundamental changes. On the
contrary, such conflicting objections provide strong proof that the
Guidelines have struck appropriate balances in the key areas of judicial discretion, purposes of punishment, and severity of sanctions.
On each of these three dimensions, compromise is essential. Criticism from "both sides" shows that the Guidelines are working, not
that they have failed.
The Guidelines today represent a wonderfully creative synthesis of all of the conflicting goals and limitations of punishment: they
balance uniformity and flexibility, and give appropriate weight to
all major purposes of punishment. At the same time, they also respect limitations set by existing prison capacity, by the delays inherent in expanding that capacity, and by the important competing
demands on limited state budgets - schools, roads, health care,
etc. Considering the complexity of these factors, and the highly
182. See supra, text accompanying notes 61-102.
183. See supra, text accompanying notes 103-119.
184. See supra, text accompanying notes 120-145.
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emotional nature of sentencing issues, this careful balance is all the
more impressive.
All sentencing systems, including the Minnesota Guidelines,
must continue to evolve and respond to the times. But the answer
to any remaining problems in the Guidelines is not to repeal them;
nor should the Legislature continue to enact more and more laws
expanding discretion in some cases and attempting to eliminate it
in others.18 5 The Legislature must resist the temptation to micromanage sentencing policy - that is what the Guidelines Commission is for. Instead, legislators must strive to give the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission the respect and support it needs to continue to do its job. That support includes adequate funding, legislative respect for the integrity and internal consistency of the
Guidelines system, and careful attention to the makeup of the Commission to insure its continued quality, representativeness, and
balance.
The present guidelines system in Minnesota is not perfect. But
it is far better than any other sentencing structure yet devised better than Minnesota's former indeterminate sentencing system
and better than most determinate sentencing reforms, particularly
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In some respects, the Minnesota Guidelines are better today than they were when first enacted,
because they reflect a more reasonable and politically realistic balance between retributive and crime-control purposes.
Other states continue to create sentencing commissions and
guidelines modelled after Minnesota's, and the American Bar Association has recently amended its recommended sentencing standardslS6 to adopt all of the essential features of Minnesota-style,
Commission-based presumptive sentencing (without, it must be
noted, ever using the term "guidelines" - such is the negative influence of the Federal version). In particular, the ABA recommends
that every state create an "intermediate" agency (i.e., between the
legislature and the courts) to promulgate presumptive sentences,
study sentencing practices and effects, predict future correctional
populations, and match sentencing policies with correctional
resources.
The ABA's approach, like that in Minnesota (and unlike the
Federal Guidelines), reflects a careful balance between the conflicting goals and limitations of punishment. Uniformity and retributive proportionality are given greater emphasis, but sufficient
flexibility is retained (especially to mitigate sentences) to accommo185. See supra, text accompanying notes 59-60.
186. See supra note 1.
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date important utilitarian goals, resource limits, and individual offense and offender variations. The ABA, like Minnesota, gives
particularly strong emphasis to the matching of sentencing policy to
available correctional resources, so as to avoid overcrowding and
desperate "back door" releasing devices which undercut the credibility of legislative and judicial pronouncements. These accomplishments are made possible by the sentencing commission's
relative insulation from short-term political pressures, and by its
detailed information base, system-wide perspective, and expertise
in research, planning, policy formulation, and guidelines implementation. A sentencing commission can also contribute significantly
to the development of more refined sentencing policies,8 particularly
7
in the emerging area of non-imprisonment sanctions.'
The key features of this model appear suitable for adoption in
states without presumptive guidelines but with similar reform
objectives. However, the experience in some states and at the federal level suggests caution; sentencing guidelines do not guarantee
insulation from short-term politics or the absence of prison overcrowding.' 8S The best prospects for achieving the latter benefits
would appear to exist in jurisdictions which, like Minnesota, are
willing to make a strong commitment to rational and fiscally responsible sentencing policy. More and more states, faced with correctional budgets escalating out of control, now appear willing to
make that commitment.
It is always hazardous to predict the future course of legal reforms, particularly in so volatile an area as sentencing. But Minnesota-style guidelines have represented the dominant approach to
sentencing reform since the late 1970s;189 moreover, the values
such guidelines seek to promote - especially the avoidance of
prison overcrowding, misallocation of prison space, and excessive
discretion - are here to stay, and no better way has yet been found
to promote them. The future of sentencing guidelines, although uncertain at the federal level, seems bright in the states. As for the
original prototype, the future of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines should likewise be assured, provided Minnesotans and their
elected officials develop a better understanding of how the Guidelines work, and what they have accomplished.

187. See generally MoRRs & ToNRY, supra note 48.
188. See generally Frase, supra note 144; Michael Tonry, The Politics and
Processes of Sentencing Commissions, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 307 (1991).
189. Id.

